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The purpose of this study is to determine the influence of family ownership and family control on
a firm’s dividend policy of publicly listed firms in Indonesia and Malaysia. This study applied the
generalized least square panel data over 2003-2016 and considering the period of global financial
crisis 2008-2010. The results show that a firm with a higher percentage of family ownership pays
more dividend compared to non-family firms. The same effect applies to the percentage of family
control. In contrast, we found that higher debt levels will reduce the dividend payment. These findings
indicate that dividend distribution can be used as a policy to lessen agency problems of listed firms.
Keywords: family firm; family ownership; family control; dividend policy; crisis; Indonesia; Malaysia
JEL Classification: G23, G32, G35

Introduction
Several recent studies show that family firms
is dominating public corporations around the
world, especially in emerging market (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986), (Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997), (Claessens, Djankov,
Fan, & Lang, 2002). In most emerging markets,
large and growing companies mostly concentrated owned by families (Porta, Lopez-deSilanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997). Claessens,
Djankov, & Lang (2000) defined family firms
as a company with a shareholder who owns 20
per cent voting right and cash flows (Claessens,
Djankov, & Lang, 2000).
Prior studies proved that governance mechanisms such as dividends, debt, and board structure are significant in controlling agency problem type II which is relatable to free cash flow
theory that applied in family firms (Shleifer &
Vishny, 1986),(La et al., 2009). Family firms

with high growth rates will have a preference
using free cash flow (FCF) to expand the company and rely on external leverage. However,
if the company has a surplus of free cash flow,
then the free cash flow will be allocated for payment to shareholders as a dividend. Thus, this
can be a positive signal to the shareholder that
the family company will expand the company
using the free cash flow reserve fund. Considering related regulation, only family firms with
good corporate governance have a preference
for generating sufficient free cash flow to pay
dividends (Bhattacharya, 1979).
Several reasons that support a positive influence of family ownership on dividend policy
come from corporate governance literature
which suggests that internal control mechanisms may need to be complementary, especially in countries that have shareholder’s weak
legal protection (Al-Malkawi, Bhatti, & Magableh, 2014), (Pindado et al., 2011). The board
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structure with differentiating responsibilities
between the executive and independent directors is called the two-tier board system (Ponnu,
2008) and applicable in Indonesia. Companies
that embrace this system will be more transparent on responsibilities and rights incorporate
strategies, so there is no overlapping role. Another case is that Malaysia applying one-tier
board system, which is the role of the executive
and independent directors is unity and replaces
each other so that the executive director also
has the responsibility as an independent director
(Hidayat & Utama, 2003). Furthermore, Andres
(2008) suggests that family-controlled firms
usually generate earnings higher than those of
non-family firms, therefore pay a higher dividend, especially in Europe and the US (Faccio
et al. 2001).
Moreover, the association between expropriation and dividend payout is stronger in Hong
Kong family firms (How et al. 2008). The reason might be that they want to ensure the minority shareholders are well-protected from the
expropriation practices. Second, previous studies suggested that public companies in Southeast Asia generally owned by one shareholder
or a group of shareholders (Djankov, & Lang,
2000). Therefore, these largest shareholders
will have a significant role in setting dividend
policy since they can put pressure on management to adopt a particular policy (Truong and
Heaney, 2007).
Indonesia and Malaysia have relatively similar family business characteristics. For example, family businesses in Indonesia grew from
42 per cent in 2016 to 65 per cent in 2018. This
growth is also faster than the global family
business growth, which is 39 per cent compared
with 16%. Meanwhile, 87% of family businesses in Indonesia and 90% of family businesses
in Malaysia expected to grow in the next two
years. Another similarity is that family businesses in Indonesia and Malaysia are generally
owned by the second generation and operate the
most in the manufacturing sector (PwC, 2018).
However, the findings of the study on the effect of family ownership on dividend policy are
different between Indonesia and Malaysia. For
example, Benjamin, S. J. et al. (2016) found
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that firms with a higher level of family ownership experienced higher dividend payout, vice
versa when examining the relationship between
family share ownership and dividend payout in
Malaysia. In contrast, studies on the effect of
ownership structure on dividend policy of the
listed Indonesian firms concluded that familycontrolled firms pay less dividend than those of
foreign and government-controlled firms (Setiawan et al. 2015 and Duygun et al. 2018). studies inline with Yousaf et al. (2019) found that
family firms in Pakistan pay lower dividends
to shareholders. This finding consistent with
Villalonga and Amit, 2006), Hu et al. (2007),
and De Cesari (2009), where most of the family firms expropriate minority shareholders for
their-owned benefits.
Third, the placement of family members
in strategic positions generally occurs in family firms (Villalonga & Amit, 2004). Family
members who placed in the CEO position can
minimize the company’s additional costs, such
as placing a professional manager. However,
once the company led by its descendants, it can
produce a lower stock price than founder that
can bring value to the company (Anderson et
al., 2003). A study on listed companies in the
US suggests that the founders showed bias toward other family members if occupied as CEO
positions, resulting in less optimal investment
and lower profitability (Singell and Thornton,
1997).
Fourth, from 2011 to 2015, Indonesia and
Malaysia are still experiencing a transitional
period after the global financial crisis of 20082010. The growth pattern of fluctuating GDP
has adjusted to the global financial condition
in tackling the crisis by conducting an expansion of economic policies in each country. At
the time of the financial crisis in 2009, Indonesia has a positive GDP rate despite a declining growth pattern. On the other hands, Malaysia has declining and negative growth pattern
(-0.69%) but still that value was small and does
not have a significant impact on the country.
Despite the contradicting findings on the impact of family ownership on dividend policy,
and the different board system between Indonesia and Malaysia is attractive to examine. Be-
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sides, studies that directly compare those effects
on dividend policy in two countries rarely conducted. Therefore, this study aims to investigate the influence of family ownership and family control companies, with the characteristics
of family ownership classification following
Chen, Cheung, Stouraitis, & Wong, (2005) on
the dividend policy distributed to shareholders.
Besides, this study is also investigating the impact of economic conditions, especially in the
period of global financial crisis 2008-2010. The
remaining of the paper is as follows. Section
2 consists of the relevant literature review and
hypotheses development, follows by research
methodology in Section 3. Section 4 describes
and analyses findings from the study and concludes the study in Section 5.

Literature Review and
Hypothesis Development
The agency conflicts between majority and
minority shareholders found in firms with concentrated ownership, where the ultimate owners are the family members (Claessens et al.,
2002) (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986) (Luo & Liu,
2014). This condition occurs because the majority of shareholders controlled the firm so that
it would indicate as expropriation (Porta et al.,
1997). In this case, the company’s wealth given
to the majority shareholders without considering the interests of others (Ronald C Anderson et al., 2018). Jensen (1986) suggests that
agency problem between family as controlling
shareholders and minority shareholders resulted in lower dividend policy.
Prior studies distinguished different conclusions of the influence of family ownership
and control on dividend policy. Anderson et al.
(2018) suggest that family firms have fewer agency problems than non-family firms. Thus, they
pay dividends higher than other firms (Pindado,
Requejo, & De, 2011; Yoshikawa&Rasheed,
2010; Atmaja, Tanewski&Skully,2009). On the
other hand, Subramaniam & Shaiban, (2011),
Wei, Wu, Li, & Chen ( 2011), Atmaja, (2017)
suggest that family firms tend to be associated
with more agency problems than non-family

firms. Furthermore, they have more significant
control mechanisms (La et al., 2009; Shleifer
& Vishny,1986; Porta et al., 1997). This implies that firms with high family control pay
fewer dividends than other firms, especially in
countries with weak legal shareholder protection policy (Facco&Lang, 2007). Based on the
above discussion, this study proposes the following hypotheses.
H1: Family ownership and control has significant impact on dividend policy.
Driffield (2007) suggests that family-controlled firms will minimize agency conflict and
therefore maximize a firm’s value through capital structure decision. A study by Haron (2018)
found that concentrated family ownership in
emerging markets has a significant and positive
impact on corporate debt financing. Furthermore, Jensen & Meckling (1976) propose that
the majority of shareholders have to escalate
incentive and their ability to oversee managerial performance, about leverage. Therefore, the
level of debt used as the control mechanism for
managers, and that concentrated family ownership in emerging markets have a significant
and positive impact on corporate debt financing
(Haron, 2018). An empirical study by Haron
(2018) found that family firms in Indonesia and
Malaysia are still dependent on debt financing.
Also, Thanatawee (2012) found that a firm’s
leverage has a positive and significant impact
on dividend policy since higher leverage will
minimize agency costs. Based on the above
discussion, this study proposes the following
hypothesis.
H2: The level of debt of family firms has a positive effect on dividend policy.
A study in developing countries found that
the board of director’s system in family firms is
an essential tool to monitor management decision and lowering agency costs (Ponnu, 2008).
Two board systems usually use by firms, i.e.,
two-tier and one-tier board system. The executive director has a direct responsibility in the
management. In contrast, the independent di-
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rectors were responsible for monitoring and
controlling the implementation of corporate
practices by applicable rules and provide independent consideration to overcome misleading
between directors, firm performance, and utilizing resources. In the two-tier board system,
there are different responsibilities between the
executive and the independent directors (Ponnu, 2008). Indonesia and Malaysia applied the
different board system. The application of the
two-tier board system in Indonesia will receive
the benefit of more distinct responsibilities,
rights, and obligations in implementation of
firm strategies, so it may increase the quality of
corporate governance since there are no overlapping roles (Hidayat & Utama, 2003).
In contrast, in one-tier board system which
applied in Malaysia, the role of the executive
and independent board is unity and replaceable
to each other so that the executive director also
has the responsibility as the independent director (Ponnu, 2008). Porta et al., (1997) suggest
that corporate governance has the significant
influence on dividend policy, where majority
shareholders prefer to utilize firm’s cash flows
to their interest than pay dividend to minority
shareholders. Therefore, we proposed that the
different board system will have a different dividend policy. Thus, the hypothesis is as follows.
H3: The board system of directors of a family
firm has a significant influence on dividend
policy.
The placement of family members in strategic
positions such as CEO position generally occurs
in family firms to minimize the additional costs
incurred by the company. (Belén Villalonga &
Amit, 2004). However, the expropriation for free
cash flow in the family firms affects dividend
policy. Firms which majority shareholders and
led by its founder create additional value for all
shareholders by paying the dividend. However,
when a family company led by its descendants
tend to have a lower value and mostly does
not pay the dividend (Anderson et al., 2003).
A study by Shleifer & Vishny (1986) suggests
that when the founders of family firms have a
role as CEOs, they will be more innovative and
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will enhance value for the company. Therefore,
the hypothesis is:
H4: There is a positive influence of founder
CEOs in family firms on dividend policy.
Family members usually are the ultimate
owners of the family firms and tend to have
more control over management. Therefore,
family firms tend to have less diversify ownership (Anderson et al., 2003 and Faccio & lang,
2007). Furthermore, they may face unexpected
external shock such as the global financial crisis. Several studies show that family as majority shareholders likely to allocate more free cash
flows on investment (Attig et al., 2015; and
Lins et al., 2013). The hypothesis is as follows.
H5: There is a negative influence of global financial crisis on the dividend policy

Research Methodology
Data and Sample Selection
This study uses 37 Indonesian families listed
firms and 67 Malaysian families listed firms —
the data obtained from the Indonesian Stock
Exchange and Bursa Malaysia. The sample
firms are the company with family ownership
marked by the existence block holder (control
rights) with vulnerable value 0% -5% and 5%
-33% (Chen et al., 2005), (Benjamin et al.,
2016). They must also have a positive value of
net income. It assumes that if the company has
a negative net income, then the company will
not pay dividends (zero dividends).
The amount of family ownership of the listed
firms obtained from the annual report of each
firm, while the information of the board system
acquired from Charlotte De Moor (2014), and
Gillmore Doppia, Gillner, Block, & Gerstner,
(2016) 2016). Besides, data on founder and descendant (Belen Villalonga & Amit, (2006), R C
Anderson et al. (2003) collected from the firm’s
annual report and the Bloomberg database. Besides, data on leverage, cash ratio, ROA, profitability lag, firm size, and growth, dividend payout ratio, net income, total assets are collected
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Table 1. Operational Variable
Variable
Dependent Variable
DPR i,j,t

Measurement

Source
(Mulyani, Singh, & Mishra, 2016)

Cash Dividend i,j,t
Total Assets i,j,t

Independent Variable
FamOwn, i,j,t
The percentage of family ownership
Lev i,j,t
Total Liability i,j,t

(Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000)
(R. C. Anderson, Reeb, & Anderson, 2018)

Total Equity i,j,t
Control Variable
Size i,j,t
ROAi,j,t

(Mulyani et al., 2016)
(Mulyani et al., 2016)

Ln (Book Value of Total Assets) i,j,t
Net Income i,j,t
Total Assets i,j,t

Cash Ratio i,j,t

(Mulyani et al., 2016)

Cash i,j,t
Total Asset i,j,t

Growth
Assets i,j,t
Lagprofit i,j,t
Dummy Variable
DControl5 i,j,t
DControl533 i,j,t
DYear i,j
DTier i,j,t
DFounder/desc i,j,t
Interaction Variable
ROAxYearCrisis i,j,t

(Subramaniam & Shaiban, 2011)

Total Asset i,j,t - Total Asset i,j,t-1
Total Asset i,j,t-1
ln (ROA i,j,t-1)

(Mulyani et al., 2016)

Percentage of family ownership 0% -5% and 5% -33%
valued 1.
The dummy variable from global financial crisis 2008
– 2010.
One-tier / two-tier dummy variable. Companies in
Indonesia are valued 1.
The dummy variable when CEO level is occupied by the
founder of the family firm valued 1.

(Benjamin, Wasiuzzaman, Mokhtarinia, & Rezaie
Nejad, 2016)
(Mulyani et al., 2016)

Interaction variables between ROA and global financial
crisis year 2008-2010.

Authors

manually from DataStream / Thomson Reuters
/ Annual Report. The data of listed companies
both in Indonesia and Malaysia collected from
the official website of IDX and Bursa Malaysia.
Definition of Variables
The dependent variable in this study is dividend policy, measured by the dividend payout
ratio. The independent variables are family
ownership, the board of director system, and
leverage level. This study also considers the
effect of control variables, namely cash ratio,
return on assets (ROA), lag profitability, firm
size, and growth. Dummy variables used to take
into account the crisis year of 2008 - 2010 and
family control.
During the global financial crisis, the stateowned enterprises (SOEs) significantly reduced
their dividend payouts compared to those of
private firms. However, private firms have to
adjust their expenses to realize a similar dividend payout. Besides, profitability is of essen-

(Tadbir, Sukarela, Dua, & Pengarah, 2014)
(R. C. Anderson et al., 2018)(R. Anderson & Reeb,
2003)

tial determinants of dividend payout (Fama and
French, 2001; Ankudinov and Lebedev, 2016).
Furthermore, A study by Floyd et al. (2015)
found that companies prefer to lessen their
stock repurchase rather than to reduce dividend payment. Baker et al. (2001) suggested
that previous dividend pattern, earning stability, and the level of current and predicted future
earnings are relevant factors of firms’ dividend
policy. Therefore, we include the interaction of
return on asset (ROA) and crisis year to check
the impact of ROA on dividend policy in the
crisis periods.
Table 1 presents the variables used in this
study, as well as their measures and the sources
of citation.
Model Specification
This study conducted using Generalized
Least Square (GLS) estimation. The first model
is used to test the influence of family ownership and family control on the dividend payout
5
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Table 2. Model Specification
Model Specification
Base Model
DPRi,j,t = α+β1FamOwn i,j,t-β2Lev i,j,t+β3Size i,j,t+β4 Profiti,j,t+β5 Cash i,j,t+β6Growth TA i,j,t+β7 Dcontrol5 i,j,t
(Without global financial 		+β Dcontrol533 +β Dtier +β Dfounder +β lagprofitability
+ε i,j,t
8
i,j,t
9
i,j,t
10
i,j,t
11
i,j,(t-1)
crisis 2008-2010)
Second Model
DPRi,j,t = α+β1FamOwni,j,t-β2Levi,j,t+β3Size i,j,t+β4Profiti,j,t+β5Cash i,j,t+ β6 GrowthTA i,j,t+β7Dcontrol5i,j,t
(Considering global
+ β8 Dcontrol533 i,j,t + β9 Dcrisis i,j+ β10 Dtier i,j,t + β11 Dfounderi,j,t+β12ROAxDCrisisi,j,t
		
financial crisis period
+β13Lagprofit,j,(t-1)+εi,j,t
		
2008-2010)

(1)

(2)

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Dividend Pay-out Ratio
Family Ownership
Leverage
ROA
Cash Ratio
Lag Profitability
Ln Size
Growth
Family Control <5%
Family Control 5%-33%
Family Control >33%
Founder/Descendant
Board System/Tier
No. Observation
Number of sample
Indonesian firm
Malaysian firm

Mean
0.0189
0.3969
1.2728
0.0625
0.0601
0.0033
12.0031
0.1040
0.0220
0.4258
0.5522
0.4251
0.3558
1456
104
37
67

Standard Deviation
0.0348
0.2108
2.6711
0.0355
0.0651
0.0112
1.7391
0.2204
0.1467
0.4946
0.4974
0.4945
0.4789

ratio of family firms in Indonesia and Malaysia
disregard the effect of the global financial crisis
period of 2008-2010. While the second model
examines the same influence by considering the
crisis periods. Therefore, the models are as follows:

Empirical Results
This Section consists of the description of
data employed in this study and empirical analysis of the results from the estimation models.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 presents the statistics of the data
used in this study. It consists of the mean value,
standard deviation and minimum and maximum values.
According to Table 3, it shows that the mean
value of the dividend payout ratio is 0.0189,
with a standard deviation of 0.0348. There are
several family companies in Indonesia and Malaysia, paying dividends despite having nega-
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Maximum
0.7567
0.9815
45.0483
0.1441
0.5523
0.1141
17.0528
1.9954
1
1
1
1
1

Minimum
0.0000
0.0018
0.0000
-0.0637
0.0003
-0.0199
7.8240
-0.6842
0
0
0
0
0

tive earnings. This phenomenon indicates that
the family firm has a constant dividend payout
rate to preserve corporate image or reputation.
However, some firms did not pay the dividend
in Malaysia. (Sapura Industrial BHD, Brem
Holdings BHD, Hup Seng Industries BHD, Salcon BHD, Sapura Resource BHD. It happened
in 2005 due to Malaysia’s newly imposed freefloating system on ringgit and an evaluation of
the capital market policy by imposing shortselling bans that could create various sentiments from shareholders. This causes the family companies listed on Bursa Malaysia to be
reluctant to pay dividends (Source: Financial
Times: “Malaysia Relaxed Short-Selling Ban”).
Family ownership has a mean value of
0.3969, with a volatility level of 0.2108. The
mean value of family ownership in Indonesia
and Malaysia are 0.4867 and 0.3497, respectively. PT. LPPF (2011 and 2012) merged with
PT Meadow Indonesia by merging 98.15%
share of LPPF so that the ownership of family
shares in LPPF became 98.15% in PT Meadow
Indonesia. It shows that the role of the family
has a very significant effect on corporate action
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Table 4. Estimation Results
Dependent Variable
Independent variable
C
Family ownership
Leverage
ROA
Cash ratio
Growth
Profit
Tier_dummy
Founder/Descendant
Crisis_dummy
ROAxCrisis dummy
Size
Famcon5
FamCon533
No of Observation
F Prob.

Dividend Pay-out Ratio
Base Model
Coefficient
-0.0239670
0.0311550
-0.0021458
0.0988596
0.0112226
-0.0153321
-0.1723988
-0.0041222
0.0017084

Probability
0.010 ***
0.000 ***
0.000 ***
0.000 ***
0.421
0.000 ***
0.032 **
0.057 *
0.355

0.0021498
0.0045798
0.0078839
1456
0.000

0.000 ***
0.560
0.023 **

Model with Crisis Period
Coefficient
Probability
-0.0236992
0.012 **
0.0307064
0.000 ***
-0.0021273
0.000 ***
0.1019026
0.002 **
0.0111192
0.425
-0.0155378
0.000 ***
-0.1615337
0.045 **
-0.0039664
0.068*
0.0015973
0.388
0.0001235
0.974
0.0798099
0.287
0.0020815
0.000 ***
0.0046149
0.557
0.0077868
0.024 **

Note: *** Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
* Significant at 10% level

conducted — the level of leverage measured by
a debt ratio. The leverage has a mean value of
1.and standard deviation value of 2.6711 indicates that family firms in Indonesia and Malaysia still prioritize external funding of companies derived from debt so that the debt level still
lacks the criteria as a tool for a family firm to
take expropriation measures that caused agency
problem. If the family wants to expand its firm,
the firm will use free cash flow (FCF) to repay
the debt to external parties and can lower the
dividend rate distributed to the shareholders.
Results
Table 4 presents the empirical results of the
two models using the generalized least squares
method. Results in Table 4 show that both models generate similar indications. It shows that
there is a positive and significant influence of
family ownership on the dividend payout ratio.
This finding is consistent with (Setia-Atmaja
et al., 2009, and Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2010),
(Setianto & Sari, 2017, and Pindado et al.,
2011). According to agency theory (Shleifer &
Vishny, 1986, and Claessens et al., 2002), the
presence of family ownership as shareholders
has a high degree of exponential indication in
exploiting the company’s free cash flow (FCF)
for personal purposes and prioritizing share-

holder interests held by the family. However,
this study finds that there is a positive relationship between family ownership with the level
of dividend payout ratio, which is contrary to
the evidence of agency theory. This result indicates that the higher the percentage of family
ownership in Indonesia and Malaysia as majority shareholders, the higher the degree of firm’
disclosure and a lower degree of expropriation
by the majority shareholders.
Generally, investors believe that a bird in
the hand is worth two birds in the bush (SetiaAtmaja et al., 2009). It indicates that investors
prefer cash dividend payments rather than capital gains for the sake of dividend taxes. The
minority shareholder in the family firms more
appreciates dividend than capital gain in the
future. They also assume that retained earnings
invested in new projects always contain risks
and can be misused or invested in speculative
projects which may create negative returns. Another reason is that dividend payout regularly
disciplines the management so that dividend is
used as a policy to improve the firm’s corporate
governance (Ismail, Haron, and Idayu, 2016).
The family firms in Indonesia and Malaysia have a preference to allocate free cash flow
(FCF) as debt payments if the family company is in an expansionary phase so that firms
would reduce dividend payouts. This case is
7
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Table 5. Robustness Test Results
Dependent Variable
Independent Variable

C
Family ownership
Leverage
ROA
Cash ratio
Growth
Profit
Tier_dummy
Founder/Descendant
Crisis_dummy
ROAxCrisis dummy
Size
Famcon5
FamCon533
No. Observation
Prob>Chi

Dividend Pay-out Ratio
Model with Crisis Period
Generalized Least Square
Coefficient
-0.8785120
1.4862620
-0.0294034
0.7309450
1.2608440
-0.4779667
-3.2353450
-0.1225488
-0.0578453
0.0041159
2.5257240
0.0391094
0.5913644
0.4981254
1456
0.0108000

in line with research conducted by Mulyani
et al., (2016), Arifin, (2003), and Anderson et
al., (2018). Implementing the two-tier system
would be better for reducing agency problems
and expropriation action issues by majority
shareholders in family firms with separation of
ownership and control in firms (Gillmore Doppia, 2016). However, the results of this paper
show that the implementation of two-tier in
Indonesia will hurt the level of dividends paid.
This finding indicates that the two-tier system
that applied in Indonesia has not effectively reduced the agency problem in the family firms
so that the index of corporate governance companies in Indonesia is still below the average
compared to other companies in ASEAN countries.
This study also finds that the 2008-2010
global financial crisis in Indonesia and Malaysia has no significant impact on the stability of
dividends paid. This result is with a study conducted in Oman (Al-Malkawi, et al., 2014). As
reported in www.cnnindonesia.com, the 20082010 global financial crisis did not have a high
volatility shock even in 2008 when the Fed decided to raise interest rates by 0.25 points indicating capital outflows from Indonesia and
Malaysia to the US. Furthermore, although the
firms increased the dividend payment during
crisis periods, the effect is not significant. This
indicates that family firms choose to pay more
8
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Probability
0.057*
0.001***
0.088*
0.646
0.065*
0.019**
0.414
0.251
0.524
0.982
0.493
0.174
0.125
0.003**

dividend to minimize agency problems with
minority shareholders.
Robustness Tests
In order to check the consistency of the
model, we conducted robustness test by changing the measurement of dependent variable,
i.e: dividend payout ratio using cash dividend
divided by net income before extra items (La
Porta, 2009), (Mulyani et al., 2016). We also
used generalized least square models and found
somewhat weaker but very similar results on
the influence of family ownership, family control, and leverage on dividend payout ratio. Results in Table 5 exhibit a similar effect of family ownership, family control, and leverage on
dividend policy of Indonesian and Malaysian
firms. Hence, our findings were consistent with
the basic model (See Table 4).

Conclusions and Limitation
This study aims to investigate the influence
of family ownership and family control on a
firm’s dividend policy in Indonesia and Malaysia. It found that the higher the percentage of
family ownership the greater the dividend payout ratio. In addition, the same effect applies to
the percentage of family control. In contrast, we
found that firms with higher debt levels will re-
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duce the dividend payment. Therefore, family
firms in Indonesia and Malaysia have a preference for maintaining corporate reputation by
maintaining dividend payouts despite the company’s liquidity shocks as a result of the global
economic crisis of 2008-2010 (Attig, Boubakri,
El, & Guedhami, 2015).
The findings have two essential implications.
For policymakers, the indications of potential
expropriation could provide consideration to
encourage more transparency, investor protection, and overall good governance practices.
For shareholders, the findings indicate that investments in family firms that distribute positive dividends or family firms that seem to mitigate agency conflicts through the use of debt or
dividend are reasonable

This study included classification percentage
of family ownership at level 0% – 5%, 5%-33%,
and >33% in Indonesia and Malaysia’s companies. Dividend payment (dividend payout ratio)
is a way to reduce agency problems between
shareholder and management level. The percentage of family ownership at 5%-33% is more
concentrated so that the minority shareholders
will giving much concern into uses of free cash
flow using dividend policy to minimize agency
problem and enhancing corporate’s reputation.
However, due to the ambiguity of the beneficiaries in the emerging countries, the effect of
ownership structure might not be concluded as
shown in the results. The unclear structure may
cause obscure conclusion and be a limitation of
this study
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